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ABSTRACT 
Competition for FDI with Vintage Investment and Agglomeration 
Advantages   
by Kai A. Konrad and Dan Kovenock * 
Countries compete for new FDI investment, whereas stocks of FDI generate 
agglomeration benefits and are potentially subject to extortionary taxation. We 
study the interaction between these aspects in a simple vintage capital 
framework with discrete time and infinite horizon, focussing on Markov perfect 
equilibrium in stationary strategies. We show that the tax revenue in the 
equilibrium is substantial, and higher on “old" FDI than on "new" FDI, even 
though countries are not allowed to use discriminatory taxation. Moreover, the 
agglomeration advantage is valuable, but is exploited in the short run and can 
be unstable over time. 
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investment, bidding for firms 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Wettbewerb um ausländische Direktinvestitionen mit "vintage investment" 
und Agglomerationsvorteilen 
Länder konkurrieren um den aktuellen Strom ausländischer Direktinvestitionen. 
Der Bestand an Direktinvestitionen, die sich in einem Land angesammelt 
haben, hat Agglomerationsgewinne und seine Besteuerung erlaubt es, fiskali-
sche Einnahmen zu erzielen. Die Interaktion zwischen diesen Aspekten wird in 
einem einfachen formalen Rahmen analysiert. Wesentliche Charakteristika der 
formalen Analyse sind diskrete Zeitperioden, ein unendlicher Zeithorizont und 
Investitionen, die zum Investitionszeitpunkt mobil sind, nach erfolgter Investition 
immobil sind und über mehrere Perioden abschreiben. Betrachtet werden 
Markov-perfekte Gleichgewichte. Die Möglichkeit der Besteuerung von auslän-
dischen Direktinvestitionen kann im Gleichgewicht Agglomerationsvorteile 
solcher Investitionen destabilisieren. Die Agglomeration von Kapital ist wertvoll 
für das Land, in dem sie erfolgt ist. Die Vorteile werden aber kurzfristig aus-
geschöpft. Das Gleichgewicht weist ein erhebliches Steueraufkommen auf. Da-
bei werden indirekt „alte“ steuerlich höher als „neue“ ausländische Direkt-
investitionen belastet, obwohl den Ländern die diskriminierende Besteuerung 
untersagt wird. Zudem wird die Rolle von Subventionen und finanziellen Ansied-
lungsanreizen behandelt. Die Möglichkeit, finanzielle Anreize für neue Investi-
tionen zu geben, kann vorhandene Agglomerationsvorteile festigen, kann aber 
das Steueraufkommen im Gleichgewicht reduzieren. 
 
1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) depreciates slowly once the investment has
been made in some country. During this phase, the foreign investor is poten-
tially subject to the opportunistic behavior of the host country. In particular,
as the burden of a tax on this investment or its returns overwhelmingly falls
on expatriates whose utility is typically not part of national welfare, host
countries may like to resort to extortionary taxation. This possibility makes
foreign investors reluctant to invest and may cause underinvestment, which is
known as the hold-up problem of FDI.1 Simultaneously with the slow depre-
ciation of old FDI from previous investment periods, however, new investors
show up and make the location choices for their new investments. Host coun-
tries face a trade-oﬀ. They compete in attempting to attract new FDI, and
at the same time they would like to extract revenue from their acquired stock
of FDI. If countries are not able to discriminate between old and new FDI
for tax purposes, or have agreed collectively not to do so, a country would
like to "extort" revenues from the old stock of FDI but, at the same time,
this may cause the country to lose the competition for new FDI.
We consider FDI in a framework with an infinite sequence of periods
to study the relationship between countries’ incentives to tax old FDI and
to attract new FDI, where new investment in each period is determined as
the outcome of fiscal competition between two countries, A and B. In each
period one new investor shows up and invests either in A or B. His investment
becomes fixed and immobile in the next period. Given this structure, there
is always one country that has a positive stock of old FDI and one country
with no old FDI when it comes to the fiscal competition for new FDI. The
fiscal parameters (taxes) that are chosen by the countries at the beginning
of each period apply both to the new FDI and to the old FDI in this period.
For this reason the stock of old FDI exerts a strategic eﬀect on competition.
It makes the country with substantial old FDI reluctant to choose a low tax.
The country without a stock of old FDI is more "lean and hungry". It does
not sacrifice tax revenue on immobile old FDI when choosing a low tax. In
a dynamic framework with an infinite horizon the situation is more complex
and reveals other eﬀects. In particular, the competition for winning the new
FDI in a given period is not only driven by the asymmetry in the stocks of
old FDI. Considerations about how winning the new FDI in a given period
will alter the incentives for competition in future periods also play a role. We
1A recent empirical study of outright expropriation or nationalization of FDI and a
brief literature overview is provided by Duncan (2006). Our focus is more on "cold"
expropriation that occurs via extortionary taxation. Schnitzer (1999) highlights some of
the theoretical diﬀerences between the two concepts.
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solve this problem for the tax competition equilibrium, using the concept of
Markov perfect equilibrium.
Our main results are as follows. First, we show that the Markov perfect
equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The country with the high stock of old FDI
chooses a higher expected tax rate than its competitor, but in the equilibrium
both countries win the new FDI in a given period with positive probability.
Second, even though countries cannot choose discriminatory taxes and must
choose the same tax rate to apply to old and new FDI, the expected tax
burden on old FDI tends to be higher than the expected tax burden on
new FDI. Note also that the expected overall tax burden for FDI in each
period is constant over time and the tax rates are strictly positive in all
periods. Hence, although the countries may be perfectly symmetric from an
ex-ante point of view, the vintage property of FDI shelters tax competition
between the countries from becoming a race to the bottom. Fourth, these
results contribute a novel reason for why the hold-up problem of FDI need
not be severe. Positive taxes and positive FDI occur in a Markov perfect tax
competition equilibrium.
Our analysis also allows an examination of agglomeration advantages:
new FDI may have a cost advantage if the investment occurs in a country
which has a high stock of old FDI already. We ask whether this cost ad-
vantage will generally stabilize the role of being the country with the higher
stock of FDI or whether an agglomeration advantage is likely to be only tem-
porary. We show that the country with a high stock of old FDI is likely to
lose the agglomeration advantage over time, but may re-gain it in the future.
The agglomeration advantage oscillates randomly over time between the two
countries, and this is an equilibrium outcome. A country could perfectly pre-
vent a shift of the agglomeration advantage to the competing country and
could perpetuate the agglomeration advantage by way of its tax policy. How-
ever, such behavior does not emerge in the equilibrium. Instead, a country
is tempted to extract revenue from the existing stock of FDI if it has the
agglomeration advantage. In the mixed strategy equilibrium that emerges
the country that accumulated an agglomeration advantage is more likely to
lose it in the next period than it is to keep it.
One surprising result of our analysis is that the greater the agglomera-
tion advantage enjoyed by the country with the high stock of old FDI, the
lower the tax rates of both countries in equilibrium and the lower the ex-
pected discounted value of tax revenues accruing to the two countries. Even
without an agglomeration advantage, a country with a high level of old FDI
acts more passively in the competition for new FDI, setting higher taxes on
average than its rival in order to reap the increased revenues from old FDI.
The agglomeration advantage helps counteract this disadvantage, leveling the
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playing field in the competition and therefore making both countries more
aggressive in stochastically lowering taxes in order to attract new FDI. For
the country without old FDI, this eﬀect is clear. Due to the agglomeration
eﬀect, the degree to which it must discount its tax rate below its rival’s in
order to attract new investment increases, leading it to reduce its rate on
average. For the country with old FDI, the eﬀect is more subtle. Since it
sets higher taxes on average in order to milk revenues from its old FDI, it is
more likely to lose new FDI to its rival. A greater agglomeration advantage
therefore reduces its payoﬀ from competing for new FDI in the future, when
it is more likely to have to cut taxes to overcome the advantage. Therefore,
it is willing to cut its tax rate more in the current period in order to avoid
losing its advantage.
Although agglomeration advantages increase the competition between the
two countries and lower the discounted value of tax revenues, at the same
time the diﬀerence between the present discounted value of the tax revenues
of the country possessing an agglomeration advantage and the country which
does not increases in the agglomeration advantage itself. Consequently, such
advantages are valuable assets that yield a long term flow of benefits to the
country possessing them.
Political arguments are often advanced that such an advantage needs to
be nurtured to be sustained. Although, in our framework, an agglomeration
advantage is beneficial for country that has it, in the equilibrium the country
is willing to risk losing this advantage for benefits in the short run. A closer
look at the history of agglomeration advantages and technology leadership
shows that they need not last forever. Instead, they may shift from one
location to another over time. A famous example is the shift of technology
leadership in the context of Dyestuﬀs Industries and the emergence of leader-
ship in Germany in the late 19th century. Historians describe the success of
the Dyestuﬀs industry in Germany as being brought about by several factors,
including lenient patent laws, the interaction between research and industry
and considerable public investment in chemical laboratories (see Murmann
and Homburg 2001 and Harhoﬀ 2007). Whether the German administration
was more lean and hungry than the British administration must be left an
open question here. A second piece of evidence can be gained from consider-
ation of corporate taxation in the European Union. The new member states
of the European Union choose taxes on corporate income that are far below
the average rates that apply to the European Union as a whole. Also, these
new accession countries do not have a large stock of old FDI. Hence, they
do not pay a high price in terms of reducing the tax rates on the previously
attracted FDI or their capital base more generally if they reduce their tax
rates. They are "lean and hungry", and they may shift investment agglom-
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eration away from the "old" agglomeration in the capital rich member states
towards the new member states.
The hold-up problem in FDI has been carefully studied. Several analyses
focus on the long-term relationship between the investor and the host coun-
try, in the absence of inter-country competition. Eaton and Gersowitz (1983)
showed that equilibria with tacit collusion can solve the hold-up problem be-
tween investors and the government if the government is suﬃciently patient.
Thomas and Worrall (1994) consider a dynamic game in which investment
may build up slowly over time. They also focus on equilibrium with tacit
collusion and punishment strategies. Konrad and Lommerud (2001) show
that incomplete information may partially solve the hold-up problem. If
the profitability of foreign direct investment is not perfectly observed by the
host country government, some expected share of the foreign direct investor’s
rents is shielded from expropriation even if the government can rely on an
optimal incentive contract: the investor earns an information rent in expecta-
tion, and this information rent makes positive investment feasible. Schnitzer
(1999) considers the role of control rights of the investor. The potential prof-
itability loss that results from a transfer of control rights in connection with
expropriation may deter such expropriation, but is less eﬀective in limiting
"cold expropriation" by extortionary taxation. The aspect of inter-country
competition comes into play in Janeba (2000) who shows that building up
excess capacity in diﬀerent countries may allow a multinational enterprise
to react elastically to extortionary taxation by shifting its production and
profits to the locations with low taxes. Janeba’s truly intriguing mechanism
is related in spirit to Kehoe (1989) who argues that tax competition between
regions may resolve the hold-up problems in the context of time consistent
capital taxation. In our framework the FDI and the profits it generates be-
come perfectly immobile once the investment is in place, but a country that
attracted the FDI in the past must decide how much tax to extract from this
immobile base, knowing that a choice of a high tax makes it less likely that
it will win the ongoing competition for new FDI.
Three other lines of literature are closely related to our analysis. First,
Kind et al. (2000) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) study tax competition
if capital is initially agglomerated in one of the countries. In their frameworks
the country with the agglomeration advantage may preserve this advantage
by applying ’limit taxes’. We show that, in a dynamic context with new FDI
in each period, the vintage nature of investment may cause the agglomeration
advantage of a country to be transitory. Our analysis therefore leads to a
diﬀerent prediction about the intertemporal sustainability of agglomeration
advantages and may provide an explanation for why regions or countries
may lose their agglomeration advantages over time. The vintage structure
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of investment in our framwork is similar to the ’overlapping generations‘
structure in the multi-period finite horizon model of Holmes (1999). He shows
that agglomeration at a geographic location that has a natural disadvantage
compared to another location may exhibit a drift and move to the geographic
location that has the natural advantage, if this advantage is high enough.
However, he does not address tax policy or the strategic dynamic interaction
and competition between governments.
Second, more recently, a small literature on tax competition with stocks
of capital and flows of investment has emerged. Wildasin (2003) and Hat-
field (2006) consider dynamic capital taxation as an optimal control problem.
Countries try to extract tax revenue from an imperfectly mobile capital stock
that is partially owned by foreigners. These approaches are in continuous
time. This literature does not consider a time structure of invested capital
that results in the strictly positive tax revenues of our Markov perfect equilib-
rium, and does not allow for the vintage dynamics, temporary asymmetries
and random oscillation of capital agglomeration.
Third, our analysis is related to problems that have been studied in
Bertrand markets with subsets of loyal or informed and uninformed cus-
tomers, building on the fundamental insights in Varian (1980). The nature
of the pricing equilibrium in mixed strategies that emerges from such prob-
lems is similar to the mixed strategies that result in our problem of FDI
competition (e.g., Narasimhan 1988).2 Chen and Rosenthal (1996) consider
a problem of dynamic duopoly with some customers losing their loyalty in
every period and solve for the Markov perfect equilibrium in this context.
Their framework is more general regarding the number of states that can
emerge in the Markov process, but there is no equivalent to the cost asym-
metry that results from agglomeration advantages.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the framework
of our formal analysis. Section 3 solves for a Markov perfect equilibrium and
its comparative static results. Section 4 considers investment subsidies as an
additional instrument of competition. Section 5 concludes.
2 The formal framework
We consider a dynamic framework with an infinite number of periods t =
1, 2, .... There are two countries, A and B, each with an infinite life span.
In each period one foreign investor it arrives and decides whether to locate
2Wang (2004), Andersson and Konrad (2001) and Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson
(2007) consider tax competition in finite horizon games with mobile and immobile tax
base, leading to equilibria similar to those in Narasimhan (1988).
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a unit of FDI in country A or in country B. We denote this decision as
it ∈ {A,B}. The investment exists for two periods and cannot relocate. If
it = B in period t, this investment is also located in B in period t+ 1. The
investment depreciates and disappears at the end of period t+1. Accordingly,
in each period there is one old unit of FDI that is located either in A or in
B, and one newly arriving unit of FDI that is perfectly mobile between
A and B. A unit of FDI generates profit in each of the two periods and
completely depreciates after that. The profits in each period are exogenously
given for each investment. Moreover, there is a cost of investment in the first
period of FDI. This cost may depend on the choice of location. We assume
that the cost is lower if the FDI locates in the country in which there is
already one active unit of FDI, and the cost saving that occurs in this case,
compared to investing in the other country, is equal to ∆ ≥ 0. This cost
saving is called the agglomeration advantage. If ∆ = 0, then there is no
agglomeration advantage. The FDI’s profit is then fully independent of the
location choice. If ∆ > 0, then the country which attracted the investment
it−1 in period t− 1 has an agglomeration advantage in period t: everything
else equal, the firm making the investment decision prefers to invest in the
country which attracted the investment in the previous period, due to the cost
savings. This cost saving can refer to a number of factors that are typically
associated with agglomeration advantages, including technological spillovers
from the investment in place to the newly arriving investment.3 Given these
assumptions, in the absence of governmental policy, FDI is attracted by the
region which attracted investment in the past. However, the governments in
both regions are active players and we turn to their action space next.
Countries simultaneously choose taxes TA(t) and TB(t), respectively, at
the beginning of each period t, prior to the location choice of newly arriving
FDI. These taxes are constrained from above by Tj ∈ [0, r] with r suﬃciently
small compared to the profits from FDI to make FDI always attractive and
the investor’s participation constraint non-binding. These taxes are non-
discriminatory in the sense that the tax Tj(t) that is chosen by country j for
period t applies to all FDI which resides in j in this period, both old FDI
that located in j already in period t − 1, and new FDI that locates in j in
period t.
Investors’ payoﬀs are determined by their exogenous profits in the two
periods of their activity, by the set-up costs for FDI in the first period of
3Several microfoundations for ∆ could be given, based on trade cost, knowledge
spillovers, labor market externalities and others. For a short survey and further references
see Devereux, Griﬃth and Simpson (2007). Strange, Hejazi and Tang (2006) emphasize
coping with uncertainty as a common denominator of several agglomeration advantages
that have been identified.
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activity, by the taxes they have to pay, and by their discount rate that
makes first and second period payments comparable. We assume that all
investors and governments have the same common discount rate, expressed
by a common discount factor equal to δ ∈ (0, 1), which is taken as time
invariant and exogenous. Accordingly, if it locates in A, then investor it’s
payoﬀ is
πit(A) =
½
G− TA(t) +∆− δTA(t+ 1) if it−1 located in A
G− TA(t)− δTA(t+ 1) if it−1 located in B,
(1)
with G exogenously given. Investor it’s payoﬀ of locating in B is obtained
analogously.
The determination of the objectives of governments in tax competition
frameworks is a more delicate matter. Within our restricted framework, we
assume that a government’s payoﬀ is equal to the present value of its revenues
from taxing FDI. The normative basis for this assumption is that even a
government that aims at maximizing the social welfare in the respective
country would like to extract tax revenue from FDI, because foreigners bear
the burden of these taxes, and their utility should not enter the objective
function of a government that aims to maximize the welfare of its citizens.
Accordingly, country j’s objective function at a given period t is
θt−1(Tj(t)) +
∞X
k=t
θk(Tj(k) + δTj(k + 1))δ
k−t (2)
with θk = 1 if ik = j and θk = 0 otherwise.
Before characterizing and restricting the players’ sets of strategies, we
characterize the set of histories of the game in diﬀerent periods. Assuming
that, in period t = 1, one investor had already chosen its location i0, the se-
quence of actions that is described in section 2 establishes possible histories at
any point in time. When countries make their tax choices at the beginning of
period t, a history is a sequence of actions ht = {i0, (TA(1), TB(1), i1), ..., (TA(t−
1), TB(t − 1), it−1)}, and all feasible histories at period t constitute the ele-
ments of the set Ht. Accordingly, a pure local strategy of country j at period
t is a mapping Tj(ht, t) from Ht into [0, r]. Similarly, when the investor who
arrives at the beginning of period t chooses its investment location, the map-
ping it is a mapping fromHt×[0, r]×[0, r] into {A,B} that assigns a location
choice to each feasible (ht, TA(t), TB(t)). In this framework the set of pos-
sible equilibrium outcomes is typically very large. However, it is natural to
restrict the strategy space and to look at Markov perfect equilibria. For this
purpose we restrict the set of behavioral strategies of countries and investors
to those which employ local strategies in each period t as follows. Countries
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choose Tj(it−1) ∈ [0, r], solely as a function of the location decision of investor
it−1 in period t − 1, who either invested in country A or in country B. We
allow countries to employ local randomization, described by their cumula-
tive distribution functions Fj(it−1), j = A,B, with support [0, r]. Note that,
by construction, these mappings are not dependent on the historical time
period and these restrictions require that all histories that lead to the same
investment decision it−1 are mapped into the same tax choices by countries
(with possible mixing) in period t. Similarly, we restrict the set of behavioral
strategies of investors as follows. The investor who chooses the location of
FDI at the beginning of period t makes its location choice as a function of
(it−1, TA(t), TB(t)). These restrictions require that all histories that lead to
the same investment decision it−1 and tax rate choices TA(t) and TB(t) are
mapped into the same investment choices by the investor it that chooses the
location of FDI in the respective period t. By construction, these mappings
are also not dependent on the time period.
3 Markov perfect equilibrium
We now consider the equilibrium tax choices of the governments. We de-
termine the net fiscal burden that is imposed on FDI, and whether the tax
choices stabilize or destabilize a given agglomeration advantage. In order to
make this comparison, we note that the agglomeration advantage is sustained
in a laissez-faire equilibrium forever: If ∆ > 0 and Ti(t) ≡ 0, the new FDI
would always invest in the country which has the stock of old FDI. This is
the benchmark for evaluating whether equilibrium tax policy destabilizes or
strengthens an existing agglomeration of capital.
We now turn to the equilibrium with endogenous tax policy and state our
main result:
Proposition 1 Let r > 2∆(1 + δ). (i) A Markov perfect equilibrium in
stationary strategies with positive taxes TA(i−1) and TB(i−1) exists in which
Fj(T ) =
½
(δ + 2)T + δ∆− r
(δ + 2)T + (δ − 2)∆+ rδ for T ∈ (
r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
+∆, r) (3)
and Fj(T ) = 0 for T <
r−2∆(1+δ)
δ+2 +∆ and Fj(T ) = 1 for T ≥ r, if i−1 = j,
Fj(T ) =
½
2
(δ + 2)T + 2∆(1 + δ)− r
(δ + 2)T +∆(3δ + 2) + rδ
for T ∈ [r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
, r −∆) (4)
and Fj(T ) = 0 for T <
r−2∆(1+δ)
δ+2 and Fj(T ) = 1 for T ≥ r −∆, if i−1 6= j.
(ii) If i0 = B, then the payoﬀs for A and B in period t = 1 are v∗A =
r(1+δ)−2∆
(2+δ)(1−δ)
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and v∗B = 2
r−δ∆
(δ+2)(1−δ) in this equilibrium. For i0 = A the same property holds
with A replacing B and vice versa.
Proof. For (i), consider first the choice of an investor who locates his FDI in
period t. He anticipates that the actual FDI location in t will lead to the same
expected tax burden in t+1 on this investment, because the respective host
country will will choose the same local tax strategy in period t+1, irrespective
whether this host country is A or B. The location decision can, hence, be
made on the basis of returns in period t only. In period t the agglomeration
benefit matters: investing in the country in period t that hosts the FDI made
in t− 1 has a cost advantage of size ∆. Therefore, if it−1 = B, then it = B if
TB(t) < TA(t) +∆. (5)
The FDI is made in A if the reverse inequality holds, and FDI may be
located in either country with equal probability if equality holds in (5). It
is important for this result that each investor appear and decides only once.
An investor whose FDI has expired its two periods of activity disappears and
will not re-appear with new FDI in the future.
Turn now to the tax choices by countries. Note that the one-stage devi-
ation principle applies. To see this note that the lowest aggregate payoﬀ for
a country is bounded from below by zero. Also, the highest payoﬀ (2) of a
country is bounded from above by
2r
1− δ . (6)
Payoﬀ diﬀerences between arbitrary action profiles are therefore bounded
from above by (6) for each single country.
Suppose now that all future investors and countries A and B follow the
candidate equilibrium choices in all periods t + 1, .... This allows us to cal-
culate continuation value v1 at t+1 that applies for the country j for which
it = j and the continuation value v0 that applies for the country j for which
it 6= j as follows: if Tj(t+ 1) = r, the investor it+1 locates FDI not in j, but
in the other country with probability 1. As this tax choice has a positive
probability mass in the candidate equilibrium strategy for j with it−1 = j, it
must hold that
r + δv0 = v1. (7)
Second, given the equilibrium candidate strategies, country j with it = j is
indiﬀerent in period t+ 1 between choosing Tj = r and Tj = q +∆ with
q =
r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
(8)
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being the lower bound of the equilibrium support for the country without
old FDI. As Tj(t) = q +∆ will attract FDI in period t with probability 1, it
must hold that
(
r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
+∆)2 + δv1 = v1. (9)
These two equations can be used to calculate the continuation values as
v1 = 2
r − δ∆
(δ + 2) (1− δ) (10)
and
v0 =
r(1 + δ)− 2∆
(2 + δ) (1− δ) . (11)
Consider now period t. It remains to show that the local strategies FA
and FB are mutually optimal replies. Consider first country B. Given the
candidate equilibrium choices of A, country B’s payoﬀ as a function of TB(t)
can be written as
FA(TB −∆)(TB + δv0) + (1− FA(TB −∆))(2TB + δv1) (12)
Inserting (4), (10) and (11) shows that the value of (12) is equal to v1
in (10) for all TB ∈ [q + ∆, r]. Moreover, all TB /∈ [q + ∆, r] yield a lower
payoﬀ. This makes any mixed strategy FB that has [q+∆, r] as its support an
optimal reply to FA. Turn now to the tax choices of country A, anticipating
that country B chooses FB as in (3), and the continuation values v1 and v0
as in (10) and (11). Country A’s payoﬀ as a function of TA ∈ [q, r −∆] is
FB(TA +∆)δv0 + (1− FB(TA +∆))(TA + δv1). (13)
Inserting (3), (10) and (11) shows that the value of (13) is equal to v0 in
(11) for all TA ∈ [q, r−∆) and smaller than v0 for any feasible TA /∈ [q, r−∆].
Note for completeness that (4) and (3) are cumulative distribution func-
tions, and the lower bound of taxes, q, is positive if r > 2∆(1 + δ) holds.
For (ii), the equilibrium payoﬀs v∗A and v
∗
B for A and B given i0 = B are
equal to the continuation values v0 and v1 as in (11) and (10), respectively.
The equilibrium in Proposition 1 involves mixed strategies and cannot be
in pure strategies for reasons that are analogous to Bertrand pricing games
with loyal and non-loyal customers as, for instance, in Narasimhan (1988).
The discontinuity regarding countries’ tax base at TA = TB −∆ causes the
non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies4 and yields equilibria in
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Figure 1: CDF’s TA and TB for a period t with it−1 = B, for δ = 0.9, ∆ = 0.1
and r = 1.
mixed strategies. The equilibrium cdf’s in Proposition 1 are depicted in
Figure 1 for a situation with i−1 = B.
To make the outcome intuitively plausible, consider first FA. Country A
which does not have a stock of old FDI in this period will not charge a tax
higher than r−∆; the maximum tax charged by country B is TB = r (which
is the exogenously given maximum) and given the agglomeration advantage
of country B in the respective period, with a tax that exceeds r−∆ country
A will never be able to attract any new FDI. This determines the upper limit
of the support for country A. The lower limit of A’s support is determined
similarly: country B always has the option to charge a high tax TB = r on its
immobile tax base (the FDI that located in countryB in the previous period),
and this yields positive tax revenue in this period, even if the investment in
period t will then take place in A. For this reason, B is not willing to reduce
4Consider, for instance, it−1 = B, and ∆ = 0. Country A would like to attract the
investment in period t, and is willing to undercut any positive tax rates chosen by country
B. However, for resulting high tax rates pA, country B would like to undercut A likewise,
making making pA suboptimal for A. For tax rates suﬃciently lower than r, country B
prefers to choose pB = r. But given pB = r, a pA that is discretely smaller than pB is,
again, not an optimal reply for A.
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its tax to a level arbitrarily close to zero. Instead, there is a smallest positive
tax such that B is indiﬀerent between charging TB = r on the old FDI and
not attracting the FDI in this period on the one side, and charging this
minimum tax if this yields B the FDI in that period with probability 1. This
lower limit is determined as q + ∆. But given that B will never adopt a
tax that is lower than q +∆ and A will never undercut this smallest tax by
more than ∆, the lower bound of A’s support is TA = q. Within the interval
[q, r −∆], country A randomizes in a way that makes B just indiﬀerent for
all possible choices in its support. Similarly, B randomizes on the interval
[q+∆, r) in a way that makes A just indiﬀerent between taxes in its support.
In addition this requires that B places a mass point at TB = r.
Note that the country which has the agglomeration advantage in period
t loses this advantage in the next period with a probability that is strictly
higher than 1/2 in the equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 1. In
the laissez-faire equlibrium the agglomeration advantage was sustained over
time with a probability of 1. Accordingly, endogenous tax policy destabilizes
existing agglomerations and makes it more likely that a country will lose a
historically given agglomeration advantage.
Some further qualitative properties of the equilibrium are characterized
in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 The following properties hold for the Markov perfect equilib-
rium with cdfs (3) and (4): (i) The period tax burden on "old" FDI is higher
in expectation than the period tax burden on "new" FDI. (ii) The expected
tax revenue on total FDI per period is higher than r.
Proof. The proof of property (i) uses a revealed preference argument. Let,
without loss of generality, it−1 = B . This "old" FDI is taxed by TB(t) in
period t. The "new" FDI in period t is taxed by TB(t) if it = B, and by TA(t)
if it = A. Moreover, it = A if TB(t)−∆ > TA(t). Hence, the tax burden is
the same on "old" and "new" FDI if it = it−1, and is lower (or at most the
same, which happens only if TA(t) = TB(t) and ∆ = 0) if it 6= it−1. Because
both countries randomize their tax rates independently according to (3) and
(4), outcomes with TA(t) < TB(t)−∆ happen with positive probability.
Consider (ii). The expected tax revenue could be calculated from the cdfs.
As this is cumbersome, consider an alternative measure. The sum v0 + v1 is
the present value of the sum of both countries’ tax revenue at any given t.
Now, after inserting and rearranging, this sum can be written as
v0 + v1 =
r
(1− δ) +
r − 2(1 + δ)∆
(2 + δ) (1− δ) . (14)
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This sum exceeds r
(1−δ) if r > 2∆(1 + δ). However,
r
(1−δ) is the present value
of tax revenue that emerges if, on average, the total tax revenue is equal to r
in each period, and r > 2∆(1 + δ) is the condition stated in the proposition
that is required to make the country that has no agglomeration advantage
choose a positive minimum tax in the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium exhibits the property that FDI
is taxed more heavily when it matures. Tax policies under which investors re-
ceive a preferential tax treatment in early periods of investment are known as
"tax holidays" and are widely studied in the tax competition literature. The
usual assumption in this context is that countries may be able to commit to
a lower tax for some time, but their commitment power does not stretch into
the indefinite future. In our framework "tax holidays" result endogenously
from the equilibrium outcome in which countries with a stock of old FDI have
a tendency to choose higher taxes than countries with no such stock when
competing for new FDI. It is based here on a reversion-to-the-mean eﬀect:
new FDI can choose the country which exhibits the superior fiscal conditions
in the period of investment. Old FDI has to accept the conditions chosen in
the respective country in which it is located.
The putty-clay nature of FDI causes two diﬀerent eﬀects regarding the
location choice of future FDI: an incumbency eﬀect and an agglomeration
benefit eﬀect. To study the incumbency eﬀect, we set ∆ = 0. In this case
the country which attracted FDI in the previous period has an immobile tax
base in the current period. Let this country be B. If B chooses a high tax,
it is likely that the tax chosen by A is lower and the FDI goes to A. A
high tax rate therefore is likely to make country B lose the mobile tax base
in this period, and this is a twofold loss: the country loses the tax revenue
on this tax base in the current period and it loses the advantage of having
an immobile tax base in the next period. The competing country A has a
twofold gain from attracting FDI in the current period, and this is a reason
why country A has a strong incentive to undercut the tax rate chosen by
B: first, A does not have an immobile tax base from previous FDI; hence, it
does not lose tax revenue on this tax base by reducing its own tax rate in a
given period. Second, a lower tax rate makes it more likely that the tax rate
is suﬃciently low to attract the new investment in that period, which can
then be taxed in the current period, and is an immobile tax base that can be
taxed by A also in the next period. The nature of this competition makes
it likely that a country which attracted FDI in the previous period will not
attract it in the current period. Hence, investment alternates stochastically
over time. For ∆ = 0, it is more likely that the investment takes place in the
country without immobile tax base in a given period. More formally:
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Proposition 3 For the Markov perfect equilibrium with cdfs (3) and (4),
when ∆ = 0 the probability that it = it−1 is 1/4.
Proof. Suppose it−1 = B. Then
FA(T ) =
½
2
T (δ + 2)− r
T (δ + 2) + rδ
for T ∈ [ r
δ + 2
, r)
and
FB(T ) =
½
T (δ + 2)− r
T (δ + 2) + rδ
for T ∈ ( r
δ + 2
, r) ,
with Fj(T ) = 0 for T < rδ+2 , and Fj(T ) = 1 for T ≥ r, j = A,B. Accordingly,
A "wins" the tax competition for the new investment in period t with a
probability
PA wins =
Z r
q
F 0A(x)(1− FB(x))dx = 3/4
A country that attracted the investment in the previous period has an
incentive to exploit this immobile investment, and this makes the country
disadvantaged vis-a-vis the competitor without such a stock of tax base that
can be exploited. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), one may say that
the country which currently has a stock of investment is a "fat cat", whereas
its competitor has the "lean and hungry look". This analysis reveals that the
country that attracted much past investment has a strategic disadvantage.
Capture of previous investment, hence, is not only a benefit, but equilibrium
forces drive future investment away from saturated countries and towards
lean and hungry countries.
An agglomeration eﬀect comes into play if investments exhibit positive
spillovers towards each other (or towards new investment in our case), i.e., if
there are technological benefits from agglomeration, which are measured in
our framework by ∆. The higher the agglomeration advantage ∆ enjoyed by
the country with old FDI, the lower the tax rates of both countries in equi-
librium and the lower the expected discounted value of tax revenues accruing
to the two countries. However, the diﬀerence between the present discounted
value of the tax revenues of the country possessing an agglomeration advan-
tage and the country competing with it for new investment, increases in the
agglomeration advantage∆. Consequently, when such advantages exist, they
are valuable assets that yield benefits to the country possessing them.
Proposition 4 Suppose r > 2∆(1 + δ). (i) The higher the agglomeration
advantage ∆ the lower the equilibrium tax rate of each country in the sense
of first order stochastic dominance. (ii) v1 − v0 is increasing in ∆.
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Proof. (i) Let it−1 = j and write the equilibrium distribution of country j
given in 3 as a function of ∆,
Fj(∆) =
(δ + 2)T + δ∆− r
(δ + 2)T + (δ − 2)∆+ rδ ≡
N
D
where N stands for numerator and D for denominator. Note that
dFj(∆)/d∆ =
δ
D
− (δ − 2)N
D2
=
δ
D
− (δ − 2)
D
Fj(∆)
It is easily verified that D is positive over the relevant range, so that sgn
(dFj(∆)/d∆) = sgn [δ− (δ− 2)Fj(∆)] > 0. Hence, the eﬀect of an increase
in the agglomeration parameter ∆ is to raise the probability that the country
with old FDI sets its tax rate below any given level T in the support of its
distribution. A similar result holds for the country with no vintage FDI. If
it−1 6= j, then from (4)
Fj(∆) = 2
(δ + 2)T + 2∆(1 + δ)− r
(δ + 2)T +∆(3δ + 2) + rδ
≡ 2N
D
where again N stands for numerator and D for denominator. Since
dFj(∆)/d∆ =
4(1 + δ)
D
− 2(3δ + 2)N
D2
=
4(1 + δ)
D
− (3δ + 2)
D
Fj(∆)
and D is positive, sgn (dFj(∆)/d∆) = sgn [4(1 + δ)− (3δ + 2)Fj(∆)] > 0.
(ii) From (11) and (10) it is easily verified that v1 − v0 = r+2∆(δ+2) , which is
increasing in ∆.
This calculation therefore shows that as ∆ increases both countries set
lower taxes on average but that the advantage of being the beneficiary of the
agglomeration eﬀect grows.
4 Bidding for firms
We assumed so far that countries have to tax old and new FDI according to
the same rules. A country which attracted FDI in the past, hence, sacrifices
the opportunity to levy a high tax on this immobile investment if it chooses
to compete seriously for the new investment, and this caused considerable
fiscal revenues in the equilibrium in Proposition 1. When competing for FDI,
countries are often not allowed to use discriminatory taxation with respect to
old and new investment. However, they may use an additional instrument in
the competition for new investment. As has been highlighted in the literature
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(e.g., Black and Hoyt 1989, Besley and Seabright 1999, and Kessing, Konrad
and Kotsogiannis 2008), countries may make upfront transfers to new FDI,
and may bid for FDI much like in a standard auction. This second instrument
will generally change the nature of the equilibrium and may erode the fiscal
net revenue that remains to countries.
To analyse this more formally, we enlarge set of actions of countries in
each period. Each country chooses the tax Tj(t) ∈ [0, r] that applies to any
old and new FDI that is located in country j in the given period, and also
it makes a bid Sj(t) ∈ [0, k] to the new investor in the respective period t.
Here, k is an exogenous constant, suﬃciently large to be non-binding, but
finite. For instance, any k ≥ 2r +∆ is a suitable limit. This changes period
payoﬀs of countries. Let, e.g., it−1 = B. Then the payoﬀ of country B in
period t is TB(t) if it = A, and 2TB(t)−SB(t) if it = B, and the period payoﬀ
of A is TA(t)− SA(t) if it = A and zero otherwise.
Moreover, given it−1 = B, a foreign direct investor’s total payoﬀ is equal
to G+∆+SB(t)−TB(t)−δTB(t+1) if it = B, and it is equal to G+SA(t)−
TA(t)− δTA(t+1) if it = A. Accordingly, anticipating the future tax burden
in the country of location, the investor will locate the FDI in the country with
higher payoﬀ. For equal payoﬀs we apply here a more specific tie-breaking
rule and assume that, if the payoﬀs are equal, the investor locates in the
country which has the agglomeration advantage.
Strategy sets, histories, and a restriction to Markov perfect strategies fol-
low straightforwardly from these assumptions, and we can state the following
proposition
Proposition 5 Suppose r > 2∆(1 + δ) and let i0 = B. Then a Markov
perfect equilibrium exists in which T ∗A(t) = T
∗
B(t) = r, and S
∗
j (t) = δ(r +
∆) + r − ∆ if it−1 = j, and S∗j (t) = δ(r + ∆) + r if it−1 6= j, for all
t = 1, 2, .... The payoﬀs in this equilibrium are v∗A = 0 and v
∗
B = r +∆.
Proof. Note first that the one-stage deviation principle applies also for the
augmented framework for analogous reasons. Consider now the decision of
an investor at t. As both countries charge the same tax in period t + 1,
regardless of it, the investor can base the location decision on a comparison
of period t payoﬀs. There are savings in investment of ∆ from investing
in it−1. Let it−1 = B. Then it = B if and only if SB(t) − TB(t) + ∆ ≥
S∗A(t) − T ∗A(t). Continuation play in periods t + s for s = 1, 2, ... as in the
candidate equilibrium in Proposition 5 yields continuation values for the
countries as vA = 0 and vB = r + ∆ if it = B, and vA = r + ∆ and
vB = 0 if it = A. Let it−1 = B. Suppose that B anticipates T ∗A(t) = r and
S∗A(t) = δ(r + ∆) + r. Then the payoﬀ of B becomes equal to TB(t) if
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SB(t) − TB(t) + ∆ < S∗A(t) − T ∗A(t), and equal to 2TB(t) − SB(t) + δv1, if
SB(t) − TB(t) + ∆ ≥ S∗A(t) − T ∗A(t). Among the latter choices, the payoﬀ
maximizing choice is SB(t)−TB(t) = δ(r+∆)−∆ = δ(r+∆)+ r− r−∆ =
S∗B(t)− T ∗B(t). We now turn to country A. The payoﬀ of A is equal to zero
for all SA(t) − TA(t) ≤ S∗B(t) − T ∗B(t) + ∆. Moreover, the payoﬀ for A is
negative for all SA(t)−TA(t) > δv1 = δ(r+∆) = δ(r+∆)+ r−∆− r+∆ =
S∗B(t)− T ∗B(t) +∆. This completes the proof.
Proposition 5 shows that the high tax revenue outcome in the tax com-
petition equilibrium of Proposition 1 is a consequence of a lack of a suﬃcient
number of fiscal instruments. If the countries have as many instruments as
there are types of tax bases, then the competition between countries again
becomes cut-throat in nature. This result is not unexpected and confirms
the intuition that diﬀerential taxation of tax bases with diﬀerent elasticities
tends to strengthen tax competition, as, for instance, in Janeba and Peters
(1999) and Haupt and Peters (2005).
Proposition 5 also highlights the interaction between the number of avail-
able fiscal instruments and the agglomeration eﬀect. In the absence of subsi-
dization, from Proposition 4 we know that an increase in the agglomeration
eﬀect ∆ lowers the present discounted value of tax revenues for both coun-
tries. Proposition 5 shows the reverse; an increase in the agglomeration eﬀect
∆ raises the discounted value of net revenues of the country with old FDI
and has no eﬀect on the value of net revenues for the competing country,
which are zero. This arises because, in the presence of two instruments,
competition for new FDI is decoupled from revenues extracted from old FDI.
Due to the immobility of old FDI, the host country can reap the complete
hold-up benefit, r. At the same time, perfect Bertrand-like tax competition
for new FDI drives the return from that FDI to ∆ for the host country with
agglomeration advantages and zero for its rival.
The result in Proposition 5 is interesting for two further reasons. First,
it shows that the restrictions on subsidies paid to new FDI that apply in
the European Union may moderate tax competition for FDI within Europe
and may prevent a ’race to the bottom’. Second, the result shows that tax
competition that is complemented by countries’ bidding for FDI may lead to
higher average tax revenues but lower fiscal net revenues than if such bids
are not feasible. Note that the aggregate tax revenues in the equilibrium in
Proposition 5 are equal to 2r in each period, and are smaller than 2r in
the equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 1. However, the present
value of all aggregate fiscal net revenues of all future periods is equal to r+∆
in the equilibrium with bidding for FDI, and the expression in (14) in the
equilibrium in Proposition 1. An immediate implication of the comparison
of the present value of aggregate fiscal net revenues under the two regimes is
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the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Suppose r > 2∆(1 + δ). The present discounted value of
aggregate fiscal net revenues is higher with a single instrument (Tj(t)) (in
the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1), than with two instruments
(Tj(t) and Sj(t)) (in the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 5), if and
only if r > ∆(4+δ(1−δ))
(1+δ)2 .
This observation is interesting from an empirical point of view. Empiri-
cally the relationship between capital mobility, eﬀective marginal tax rates,
and fiscal net revenues is not straightforward. For instance, sustained or even
increasing tax revenue has been observed jointly with a reduction in marginal
tax rates.5 If the increased competition for FDI has been complemented with
a change in the number or composition of instruments, sustained or even in-
creasing tax revenue does not preclude a drop in fiscal net revenue. As shown
in Proposition 6, for δ suﬃciently large, two instruments generate less fiscal
revenue than one. At the same time, the average statutory tax rates are
higher than in the case with only one tax instrument.
5 Discussion
Countries that compete for FDI face a trade-oﬀ. They would like to attract
further FDI, which is easier if the country can oﬀer attractive fiscal condi-
tions. Countries would also like to extract tax revenue from FDI, once the
investment is in place and cannot easily be relocated. This trade-oﬀ is stud-
ied here, allowing for fiscal competition for FDI. We take account of the fact
that FDI is mobile ex-ante and can react to the fiscal conditions that apply in
diﬀerent countries, that FDI becomes immobile and potentially subject to ex-
tortionary taxation once it is in place while it depreciates over time, and that
the competition for the flow of fresh FDI and the extraction of revenue from
old FDI occurs simultaneously. We analyse a Markov perfect equilibrium
of this dynamic problem assuming that countries have very limited means
for treating fresh FDI fundamentally diﬀerently from old, immobile FDI. In
addition, we allow for potentially positive agglomeration eﬀects, defined as a
cost advantage for FDI from locating in a country which has a high stock of
FDI.
Our main findings are: A country’s acquired stock of immobile FDI is a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, the country can extort this immobile tax
5Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002), for instance, address the puzzle that corporate
tax revenue did not decrease, despite decreases in tax rates.
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base. On the other hand, such extortionary taxes will aﬀect newly acquired
FDI. The temptation to extort the immobile tax base is a strategic disadvan-
tage in the tax competition for new FDI. As a result, the country which has
accumulated a stock of immobile FDI at the beginning of a period will, on
average, charge a higher tax, and is likely to lose the agglomeration advan-
tage to a country without a stock of immobile FDI. A frequent change in the
agglomeration advantage between countries will be observed along the equi-
librium path in a Markov perfect equilibrium with stationary strategies. Our
theoretical results appear to be consistent with empirical results by Dumais,
Ellison and Glaeser (2002). They recognize (p. 193) that "...concentration
is the outcome of a life cycle process in which new plants are constantly
being born, existing plants are expanding and contracting at diﬀerent rates,
and a substantial number of businesses are failing" and consider empirically
what drives agglomeration and deagglomeration. They find that (p. 200)
"...new firm births and expansions of existing plants have a deagglomerating
eﬀect...". We provide a fiscal competition argument that can explain this
eﬀect. Moreover, we find that the agglomeration advantage intensifies both
countries’ incentives to charge lower taxes.
In the analysis we first assumed that countries cannot rely on discrimina-
tory taxation that allows taxation of old and new FDI with diﬀerential rates.
The empirical counterpart of this assumption is the convention according to
which diﬀerential treatment of diﬀerent types of capital investment is con-
sidered as harmful tax competition (by the OECD). Of course, countries are
innovative in finding arrangements to circumvent any rule against discrimi-
natory taxation. For instance, when it comes to FDI, countries often promise
tax holidays where this is legally feasible, provide investing firms with public
infrastructure without charging an adequate user fee, or sell them property
or other production inputs at below market value.6 If discriminatory taxa-
tion is feasible, it changes the nature of the equilibrium. A Markov perfect
equilibrium emerges in which each country taxes the stock of investment that
has previously been invested in this country at its maximum. Independently
of this time consistent treatment of old FDI, the countries compete in at-
tracting new FDI. This was analysed in section 4. As a result, agglomeration
may perpetuate itself, but the economic advantage of agglomeration may be
very small.
We considered only two countries and assumed new FDI depreciates in
two periods. If there are more than two countries, only the countries with the
smallest stocks of old FDI are likely to enter seriously into the competition.
6This motivates the study of the acquisition process of FDI as an auction, as in Black
and Hoyt (1989), Besley and Seabright (1999) and Oman (2000).
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However, it would be appropriate to allow for more than one FDI project per
period in an analysis that allows for more than two countries as well. Finally,
if FDI lasts for more than two periods, this will also generate interesting new
questions, but at a considerable cost of complexity. For instance, for three
periods, two countries and one FDI project arriving in each period, the set of
states in a given period t has four elements: the two states in which it−2 and
it−1 occurred in the same country (A or B), and the two states in which it−2
occurred in one country and it−1 occurred in the other country. The study
of two countries, one project at a time, and a time horizon of two periods for
each FDI project is the minimal framework in which vintage eﬀects of such
investment can be studied in a tax competition framework, but we expect
that many of the insights carry over qualitatively to a more complex setup.
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